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pay the invoices that Sign subsequently
mailed to her.
Sign filed a collection suit against
DeLaurenti, alleging breach of con-
tract and unjust enrichment on
DeLaurenti's part. DeLaurenti coun-
terclaimed and alleged that Sign vio-
lated the CPA. The Washington trial
court held that Sign violated the CPA
and awarded DeLaurenti treble dam-
ages and attorney's fees. Sign appealed
the decision to the Washington Court
of Appeals.
Sign's Arguments Unplugged by
Appellate Court
The appellate court first addressed
Sign's argument that the trial court
erroneously submitted the CPA claim
to the jury because insufficient evi-
dence existed to support it. The court
noted that a CPA violation occurs when
(1) the action complained of is a decep-
tive act or practice; (2) the action oc-
curs in the conduct of trade or com-
merce; (3) sufficient evidence of pub-
lic interest is presented; (4) injury to a
business transpires; and (5) a causal
link exists between the deceptive act
and the injury.
The court found that DeLaurenti
demonstrated all the elements of a CPA
violation and upheld her claim under
the CPA. First, the court stated that
Kelly's misleading DeLaurenti into
believing that she was signing a work
authorization form constituted an un-
fair act or practice in trade. Second,
the court found that Kelly's capacity as
Sign's agent presented sufficient evi-
dence of an impact on the public inter-
est. The court also found that
DeLaurenti suffered injury to her busi-
ness, therefore meeting the fourth ele-
ment of a CPA violation, because
Delaurenti had to spend time address-
ing the contract dispute rather that
attending the store. Lastly, the court
concluded that the deceptive act di-
rectly caused the injury to DeLaurenti's
business. Thus, the appellate court
affirmed the trial court's finding that
Sign violated the CPA.
Treble Damages Too Much
The court, however, agreed with
Sign's contention that treble damages
were improper since DeLaurenti could
not prove any actual damages. In its
determination, the court concluded that
attorney's fees were not actual dam-
ages as contemplated by the CPA.
Furthermore, the court concluded that
DeLaurenti's general and uncor-
roborated estimate of her lost profits
also failed to constitute actual dam-
ages. Therefore the court held that
since DeLaurenti could not prove any
actual damages, her claim for treble
damages was unsubstantiated.
Attorney' Fees were Reasonable
Awards
Although Sign did not dispute that
the CPA entitled DeLaurenti to
attorney's fees, it did argue that the
trial court improperly calculated the
award of attorney's fees. The court,
however, reasoned that the trial court
had discretion in awarding attorney's
fees, and thus, upheld the trial court's
determination. Furthermore, the ap-
pellate court noted that in its determi-
nation, the trial court segregated the
fees to the extent possible between the
CPA theories and other legal theories
presented by DeLaurenti. The appel-
late court deemed such action appro-
priate, and therefore concluded that the
lower court acted within its discretion.
Dissent Argued that Shop was Not
Significantly Injured
In his dissent, Judge Scholfield stated
that the evidence of injury to the floral
shop was insufficient to support the
award of attorney's fees. To support
this claim, Scholfield stated that nei-
ther attorney's fees in prosecuting a
CPA violation nor the time devoted to
the CPA litigation were sufficient proof
of injury. Thus, Scholfield concluded
that DeLaurenti failed to present suffi-
cient evidence that she suffered a le-
gally recognizable injury. *
- Ellen M. Sfikas
Toll-Free Phone Line Failed
to ProvideAdequate
Warning Under California
Statute
In Ingredient Communication
Council, Inc. v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr.
2d 216 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals held that a toll-
free phone line warning system failed
to clearly and reasonably warn con-
sumers about dangerous chemicals con-
tained in consumer products and there-
fore violated California's Safe Drink-
ing Water and Toxic Enforcement Act
of 1986.
Failure to Warn
California's Safe Drinking Water
and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986
("Act") forbade any person or entity
from intentionally or knowingly ex-
posing anyone to a chemical associated
with cancer or birth defects without
first giving "clear and reasonable" warn-
ing. The Act acknowledged that gen-
eralized warnings such as product la-
bels, posted notices, and notices in
news media adequately warned con-
sumers, assuming that they were "clear
and reasonable." The California State
Health and Welfare Agency ("Agency")
administered the Act and promulgated
regulations defining appropriate con-
duct under the Act.
The Ingredient Communication
Council, Inc. ("Council") is a non-
profit corporation consisting of thirty-
seven manufacturers, retailers, and ag-
ricultural producers involved in mar-
keting thousands of products in Cali-
fornia stores. Founded in 1987, the
Council sought to help its members
comply with the Act. The Council
established a consumer warning system
based on a toll-free phone line in con-
junction with newspaper advertising
and signs posted in stores. Although
the Council's advertisements and signs
failed to identify those products which
required warnings under the Act, they
invited consumers to call a toll-free
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number and inquire about specific prod-
ucts.
The Council brought an action
against California's attorney general,
seeking both an authoritative interpre-
tation of regulations promulgated un-
der the Act and a declaration that its
system clearly and reasonably warned
consumers. The attorney general re-
sponded by seeking a declaration that
the system failed to provide clear and
reasonable warning. The trial court
held that the system violated the regu-
lations and therefore violated the Act.
The Council appealed, contending that
the trial court: 1) misinterpreted the
regulations' "safe harbor" warning pro-
visions; 2) applied the wrong standard
in evaluating the system; and 3) based
its decision upon insufficient evidence.
Toll-Free Phone Schemes Are Not
Clear and Reasonable Per Se
Since violations of the Act result in
civil liability, the Agency promulgated
regulations containing "safe harbor"
warning methods. The Agency deemed
the safe harbor methods per se clear and
reasonable, thus removing the need for
factual determinations of clearness and
reasonableness. The Agency also es-
tablished the following warning meth-
ods for consumer products as clear and
reasonable per se: product labels with
specified text; shelf signs with speci-
fied text; and a scheme of signs, public
advertising, and toll-free phone ser-
vices that provide clear and reasonable
warning. Thus, of the three warning
schemes listed, only the toll-free phone
line independently required clear and
reasonable warning.
Although the Council conceded that
toll-free phone lines could not qualify
as "pure" safe harbor methods, it ar-
gued that the extra condition of clear
and reasonable warning only required
it to provide a quality phone line as
compared to other toll-free phone lines.
The California Court of Appeals re-
jected this argument. The court relied
on the Agency's Final Statement of
Reasons, which denied toll-free phone
lines safe harbor status because the
Agency did not consider them clear and
reasonable per se.
The Council also argued that no
bright line existed between safe harbor
and non-safe harbor warnings. They
maintained that even product labels
and shelf signs must be reasonably
presented to qualify as safe harbor
methods. The court, however, rejected
this argument because the Council over-
stated the regulations' threshold re-
quirement that product labels and shelf
signs be easily noticeable. Moreover,
the court found no language in the
regulation creating an intermediate stan-
dard between safe harbor and non-safe
harbor warnings. Thus, whether the
system compared favorably to other
toll-free phone lines was irrelevant to
whether it clearly and reasonably
warned consumers.
The Trial Court Applied the Correct
Standard of Review
The regulations provided that when-
ever the Act required a clear and rea-
sonable warning the method of trans-
mitting that warning, must be reason-
ably calculated, considering alterna-
tive methods, to make the warning
available to consumers before expo-
sure. The trial court held that reason-
able calculation implied effectiveness
in operation. The Council, however,
contended that even if the trial court
correctly viewed the system as a non-
safe harbor method, it erred by requir-
ing that the system operate effectively.
The Council argued that reasonable
calculation contemplated only the situ-
ation when it created the system, not
whether the system effectively warned
consumers at an unspecified later date.
The appellate court considered this
interpretation too narrow. The court
held that an initial calculation of a
warning's effectiveness may prove
unreasonable in light of experience.
The court stated that adhering to an
incorrect initial judgment about a warn-
ing method's efficacy violated the Act's
requirement of clear and reasonable
warning.
The Council also argued that the
trial court's requirement that the sys-
tem effectively convey warnings con-
flicted with the regulations' language
stating such warnings merely be made
available before exposure. The appel-
late court rejected this argument too,
because it viewed effective conveyance
and availability as consistent, when
considered in context. The court con-
strued availability as the probability of
consumers perceiving a warning mes-
sage. Similarly, effective conveyance
described the likelihood of consumers
seeing or hearing a warning before
exposure, not whether they understood
that warning and acted upon it.
Consequently, the system's invita-
tion to inquire about specific products
through the toll-free phone line failed
to make the required warnings avail-
able within the regulations' meaning
because consumers could receive the
warning only through considerable ef-
fort. The court also held that although
the Council need not use the most
effective warning method possible, it
could not reject measures which would
significantly improve the warnings'
effectiveness without significantly in-
creasing costs.
Ample Evidence Supported the Trial
Court's Decision
The Council also argued that the
trial court erred because it based its
decision upon insufficient evidence.
The appellate court acknowledged the
Council's evidence suggesting public
apathy about the Act. The court also
recognized that adopting safe harbor
warning methods would increase costs
and that product labels and shelf signs
sometimes fail. The court held, how-
ever, that evidence of the system's
failure to clearly and reasonably warn
consumers amply supported the trial
court's decision.
The record showed that the system
provided only 488 warning messages
in its first year, even though over 26,000
calls reached the system. The court of
appeals held that this evidence alone
created an inference that the system
failed to clearly and reasonably warn
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consumers. The attorney general's
expert witnesses, moreover, testified
that consumers probably would not
spend time to identify specific products
and then phone to receive warnings.
The experts explained that impulse
motivates two-thirds of grocery buy-
ing decisions and that consumers typi-
cally decline to research inexpensive
purchases.
Expert testimony also established
that the Council's store signs were
inconspicuous, that the newspaper ad-
vertisements were infrequent, and that
the phone line's taped messages would
likely discourage all but the most dili-
gent consumers. The court recognized
that the small number of warnings the
Council provided in its first year re-
sulted from consumers' assumption of
product safety, rather than from their
apathy. One expert testified that the
least effective product label would con-
vey warnings required under the Act
more effectively than the Council's
toll-free phone system. *
- Matthew Brady
Only Plaintiffs Can
Constitutionally Receive
Punitive Damages
In Smith v. States General Life Ins.
Co., 592 So. 2d 1021 (Ala. 1992), the
Alabama Supreme Court held that a
trial court lacks the authority to allo-
cate a portion of a constitutionally
valid punitive damage to any entity
other than a plaintiff.
Fraudulent Insurance
Martin B. Smith ("Smith") pur-
chased a medical insurance policy from
Fred White ("White"). At the time of
the purchase, White represented to Smith
that the insurance company would re-
consider certain conditions excluded
from the policy one year later. White
stated that if, upon the reconsideration
of the policy a year later, Smith's
physical condition remained stable or
improved, the insurance company would
delete the exclusions.
The actual policy, which was issued
by States General Life Insurance Com-
pany ("States"), included States' stan-
dard "Reconsideration Privilege." This
provision also indicated that States
would consider deleting any exclusions
one year after the issuance of the policy.
Smith sued States, White, and
White's employer, The Barton Agency
("Defendants"), claiming fraud in and
about the sale of a policy for medical
insurance coverage. Smith alleged that
the Defendants never intended to re-
consider the policy exclusions. In ad-
dition, Smith stated that the Defen-
dants intended to deceive him in an
effort to induce him to buy the policy.
Smith filed his claim and presented
his case to a jury. The jury awarded
Smith punitive damages of $250,000
and compensatory damages of $600.
The Defendants filed several post-trial
motions asserting that the punitive dam-
age award was excessive.
Mini-Van Recall
Ford Motor Co. and Nissan Motor Co. have recalled some 1993-model
mini-vans because the vehicles may have suffered accidental fuel hose cuts
during assembly. The 1,700 vehicles recalled are the Mercury Villager and
the Nissan Quest, which are the products of a joint venture between Ford
and Nissan and which are built side-by-side at a plant in Avon Lake, Ohio.
The fuel-hose problem may cause fuel leaks in those vehicles.
Sorry Insurance Company
Based on its conclusion that the
punitive damage award was within the
jury's authority, the trial court denied
the Defendants' motions. The trial
court based its evaluation of the puni-
tive damages on statutory law and two
Alabama cases, Hammond v. City of
Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374 (Ala. 1986)
and Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.
2d 218 (Ala. 1989). In accordance
with the applicable statute, Ala. Code
§ 6-11-23, and these cases, the court
found that the punitive damage award
was proper and an appropriate tool
with which to punish the Defendants.
Specifically, the trial court noted
that the award represented a windfall to
Smith and would injure, but not seri-
ously affect, States. The court also
determined that the punitive award was
not related to the compensatory award.
In addition, the court considered the
high degree of reprehensibility and the
pattern of conduct employed by States.
Although the court found that States
had ample opportunity to remedy the
situation, it noted that States had nei-
ther acknowledged nor made any at-
tempt to remedy the wrong.
The trial court proceeded to allocate
one-half of the punitive damages
awarded to Smith to the American
Heart Association. In so doing, the
court relied on the concurring opinion
in Fuller v. Preferred Risk Life Ins.
Co., 577 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 1991) in
which Justice Shores stated that trial
courts have the inherent power to allo-
cate punitive damages. Within this
power, the court could allocate an award
in a way that would serve the purposes
behind punitive damages to a greater
degree than to grant the whole award to
the plaintiff. An appeal was filed and
taken to the Alabama Supreme Court.
Punitive Damage Award Was Proper
The Supreme Court of Alabama
upheld the $250,000 punitive damage
award. The court noted that based on
the trial court's findings, there was no
evidence indicating that the jury's ver-
dict was founded on improper motives
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